While Cadbury was initially vulnerable resulting in this take over, Kraft had to borrow heavily to afford the final price of 850p per share. In the coming months and years, Kraft will have to balance against recovering the money put into this acquisition (Wiggins, 2010). A risk, many British politicians and citizens alike fear will mean the end of their signature chocolate in an effort by Kraft to increase their profit margin quickly.
Case Study 2: Discussion
The Kraft acquisition of Cadbury is a corporate negotiation making headlines across the world both for the magnitude of the deal and the incredible hostility which marked the negotiations prior to the final signing of the agreement. Cadbury wound up in a financially vulnerable position after several strategically bold maneuvers ultimately resulted in a poor stock showing for the newly de- merged Dr. Pepper Snapple drinks company, and the reliance of Cadbury on financing from institutions which were ultimately crippled by the credit crunch. It had become inevitable that Cadbury would either have to sell or merge to stay afloat given its poor performance in the recent past.
Irene Rosenfeld of Kraft employed a highly adversarial and aggressive negotiation strategy by taking her initial purchase offer which had been rejected to the press. She knew that the fiercely ethnocentric brand would be unlikely to sell to the food conglomerate, so rather than risk losing to a competitor such as Hershey, Rosenfeld upped the stakes and let the stakeholders decide.
In retrospect, Cadbury blames its large number of what they term "short-term" investors for ultimately having to agree to less than favorable terms with Kraft. However, Cadbury despite its status as a British national treasure was historically of little interest to more long-term investors. The company stock had an impressively poor showing in British investment.
Though Rosenfeld managed to acquire a lucrative already branded company, the way in which she acquired it may ultimately result in a negative corporate outcome for Kraft. The company had to borrow heavily to afford the 850p per share, and ultimately might not even be revenue neutral for the first year or so of integrated production. She has also been warned by both political stake holders and corporate alike that if the quality of Cadbury suffers as a result of the Kraft acquisition, there will be stiff consequences not just for Rosenfeld but also for Kraft.
Though her negotiation tactics were less negotiating and more strong-arming, the results ultimately turned in favor of the direct and persistent approach. However, the extremely unpleasant nature of the acquisition will make the transition into Kraft even more difficult. It is important even in the most highly charged of negotiations to remember that even if an individual or even an entire company is an adversary presently they will likely be a colleague tomorrow.
Case Study 3: Vodafone takes over Mannesmann
Mannesmann and Vodafone are both telecommunications giants. Though independent the two corporations have worked together in Europe for years, partnering successfully to bring service to millions of customers across Europe. The two companies jointly owned Germany's largest mobile phone service provider as well as Italy's second most popular firm. The trigger for Europe's largest corporate buyout (£112bn) was Mannesmann's acquisition of Orange which is the third largest UK service provider for (£36bn) ("Mannesmann seals deal"). Though the two giants had worked together successfully for several years, this corporate takeover was still hostile in nature. Mannesmann was not looking to sell, however the purchase of Orange left the giant somewhat vulnerable at which point Chris Gent of Vodafone presented his initial offer of a merger.
Officially now the corporations are merging, however more than half of the company will be owned by Vodafone while 49.5% of the new enlarged company will belong to Mannesmann (Watkins, 1999). However, the less than 50/50 split held up negotiations for several months. Initially Vodafone presented an offer which meant that Mannesmann shareholders would get only 47% of the merged company, Esser (chairman of Mannesmann) initially wanted to hold out for his shareholders to have 58.5% of the merged company (Watkins, 1999). Vodafone however being the acquiring agent was definitely not going to cede controlling share of the merged corporation to the asset they were acquiring. During the tense and at times hostile negotiations, the share price for Mannesmann spiked 119%, unfortunately though as the end of the 60 negotiation period drew to a close it was evident that Esser would have to negotiate the best terms of an acquisition which was inevitable ("Mannesmann...
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